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The Constitutionality of Continuing Residency




Municipal, county, state, school district and other local govern-
ment employees constitute a large percentage of the nation's
workforce. Approximately 3,984,000 persons are employed by
state governments and 10,144,000 persons are employed by other
local governmental units.1 Of these employees, 1,634,700 work in
state education and 5,766,500 are employed by local educational
systems.2 State and local governments often compel these employ-
ees through continuing residency requirements to live within the
governmental unit employing them.
Governmental units advance a number of reasons to justify
these requirements, including greater job efficiency, a return of
the employees' salaries to the governmental unit through an in-
creased tax base, benefits to the local economy and an increase in
the number of homeowners in the local community.
Durational residency requirements are distinguished from con-
tinuing residency requirements. The former require that a pro-
spective employee prove he has lived in the community for a pre-
scribed period of time to be eligible for employment.3 They have
further been held to impinge on the fundamental right to travel,
forcing a governmental unit to show a compelling interest to jus-
tify them.4 In contrast, continuing residency requirements demand
only that governmental employees live in the community during
the term of their employment.
Durational residency requirements will not be analyzed here.
The imposition of continuing residency requirements on policemen
and firemen also will not be analyzed here. Governments have
* Special Assistant County Counselor, Jackson County, Missouri; B.A. William Jew-
ell College, 1967; J.D. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1984.
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. US. DEP'T OF LABOR. EMPLOYMENT AND EARN-
INGS 88 (July, 1986).
2. Id.
3. Andre v. Bd. of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 52 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Comment, Durational Residency
Requirements for Public Employment, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 386 (1979).
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been justified in imposing these requirements on policemen and
firemen because of the compelling interest in providing the com-
munity with day and night police and fire protection.5 Rather, this
Article will focus on continuing residency requirements and their
conflict with the equal protection and privileges and immunities
clauses of the United States Constitution.
I. GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS
In Ector v. City of Torrance,8 the California Supreme Court
recited a number of justifications commonly advanced by local
governments as rational reasons for the imposition of continuing
residency requirements. The Ector court found that the reduction
of local unemployment, benefits to the local economy and in-
creases in the tax base were often asserted as justifying these
rules. These rationalizations taken together are known as the
"public coffer theory."'7 Another justification often used is the goal
of ethnic balance. Further, the availability of manpower for emer-
gencies such as snowplowing in blizzards, fixing broken water
mains and correcting malfunctioning traffic lights often is ad-
vanced to justify continuing residency requirements for public
works employees. Job efficiency theoretically is advanced by such
a requirement since employees become familiar with the problems
and needs of the community they live in and acquire a personal
stake in its fortunes. Employee tardiness and absenteeism argua-
bly are reduced when employees live near their job sites. More-
over, citizens' confidence in the local government is increased
when it is managed by its own residents.
Although courts have adopted many arguments to support resi-
dency requirements, the "public coffer theory" is widely believed
to be constitutionally unacceptable. Thus, the United States Su-
preme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson8 held that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits government
from apportioning its benefits and services according to an individ-
ual's tax contribution.9 Also, the Supreme Court held in Memo-
5. Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App.
2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708, 717 (1975); Annotation, Policemen-Firemen Residency Re-
quirements, 4 A.L.R. 4TH 830 (1981).
6. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 104 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974).
7. Hager, Residency Requirements for City Employees: Important Incentives in
Today's Urban Crisis, 18 URB. L. ANN. 197, 207 (1980).
8. 394 U.S. 618, 631-34 (1969).
9. See Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972); Hager, supra
note 7, at 207.
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rial Hospital v. Maricopa County1 ° that "a state may not protect
the public fisc by drawing an invidious distinction between classes
of its citizens. ."I Similarly, restricting public jobs for the
area's unemployed is not a permissible public purpose."2
Using public employment residency requirements to change the
racial and ethnic balance in the community is patently unconstitu-
tional when it involves discriminatory hiring. Such a purpose im-
plies that a local government will hire members of a racial or eth-
nic group from outside its borders disproportionally to the group's
presence within the governmental unit. In Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,13 the Supreme Court discussed racial preference in hiring.
Fullilove involved mandatory minority participation in a federal
public works program. The Supreme Court stated: "Any prefer-
ence based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a
most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict
with constitutional guarantees. 1 4
Thus, such an action by local governments would surely invoke
strict scrutiny because a suspect classification is involved. A com-
pelling governmental interest would be required to justify such ac-
tion. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,15 a
landmark case construing the constitutionality of a unversity's mi-
nority acceptance program, Justice Powell in his swing vote wrote:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its
race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be re-jected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or eth-
nic origin is discrimination for its own sake.16
Such a hiring practice by local governments arguably furthers
the goal of an economically healthy and desirable community.
However, the Supreme Court in Fullilove held that any goal,
other than a remedial objective in correcting past discrimination,
is suspect.1  The Sixth Circuit's analysis of these Supreme Court
cases indicates that in order to justify an ethnically or racially
biased hiring program, (1) some legitimate governmental interest
10. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
11. Id. at 263.
12. Ward v. Bd. of Examiners, 409 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (D.P.R. 1975), affd 429
U.S. 801 (1976).
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
14. Id. at 491.
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Id. at 307. The Bakke decision did not result in a consensus opinion; what seems
to have emerged is that a university may give weight to an applicant's race, but may not
establish a quota based on race.
17. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486-87.
[Vol. 23
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must be served and (2) the program must be directed to that in-
terest. 18 The governmental interest served must be compelling
since strict scrutiny will be used by courts reviewing the pro-
gram.19 Local governments will probably be unable to demon-
strate successfully that a racially or ethnically biased hiring pro-
gram can be sufficiently "directed" towards the goal of an
economically healthy and desirable community. Such a goal, when
it is furthered only indirectly by such a hiring program, likely will
be held insufficiently compelling to justify such discrimination.
Local governments will encounter further difficulty in demonstrat-
ing that other, more constitutionally acceptable methods are not
available and are not more likely to succeed. Aside from the con-
stitutional problems, the local constituency would likely oppose
such a program since its own opportunities for public employment
would be so reduced.
Job efficiency has been the most successful reason advanced by
local governments for imposing continuing residency require-
ments. However, this reason seems artificial and contrived when
analyzed. The erratic borders of modern-day cities and other gov-
ernmental units often result in an employee being closer to his
work site if he lives outside the governmental unit that employs
him than if he was living within the unit.20 To mandate where one
is to live and raise a family arguably has a deleterious effect on an
employee's morale, especially where attractive suburban areas lie
near, although outside, the governmental unit.
Courts have thus far been willing to uphold continuing resi-
dence requirements. However, two cogent bases can be used to
argue against such rules: The equal protection and the privileges
and immunities clauses of the United States Constitution.21
18. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir.
1983). Legitimate governmental interests could arguably include eliminating the effects of
past discrimination and obtaining people for jobs which require unique racial or ethnic
background.
19. Id. at 886.
20. Hanson v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, Wyandotte County, Kan., 364 F. Supp.
330, 334 (D. Kan. 1973).
21. Another constitutional argument against continuing residency requirements is
based on the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. When a govern-
ment infringes on an individual's due process interest, "the established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competence of the state to effect." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
However, courts have held in numerous cases that due process is not violated by continuing
residency requirements. See, e.g., Cook County Teachers' Union Local 1600 v. Taylor, 432
F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
1986]
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II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In applying the equal protection clause to particular cases,
courts must initially determine how closely to scrutinize the im-
pact of these requirements. The Supreme Court has stated: "Un-
less a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion,
or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the stat-
utory discriminations and require only that the classification chal-
lenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 2
Thus, in the absence of the creation of a suspect class or any
infringement on a fundamental right, the traditional or "minimum
scrutiny" test is used to analyze the questioned state action.2 3 The
courts will use "strict scrutiny" in analyzing state action when an
invidious class is created or fundamental rights are violated.
Under the strict scrutiny test, the state must justify its actions
with a "compelling interest. 24 In addition, legislation affecting
constitutional rights must meet an "exacting standard of preci-
sion. '25 Legislation cannot be overly broad in its impact.
A. Suspect Classes
It has been held that a suspect class is not created by the impo-
sition of continuing residency requirements on public service em-
ployees.2 Nonetheless, the argument can be made in some situa-
tions that a suspect class is created by a local government because
of these requirements. Suspect classifications triggering strict
scrutiny include race, nationality, alienage, gender and
indigency.27
Whether a suspect or invidious class of persons has been singled
out for different treatment because its members share a particular
characteristic "may be indicated by numerical cdmpilations show-
ing that a disproportionate number of that group are affected."'2 8
But this alone is not enough. "State action which affects a greater
proportion of one group more than another, standing alone, is not
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause."2 9 The proponent of
the particular law must also show that the facially neutral legisla-
22. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
23. Hager, supra note 7, at 200.
24. Id. at 201.
25. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
26. Mogle v. Sevin County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478, 483 (10th Cir. 1976). See
also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
27. Benson v. Arizona Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 277 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tion "has the purpose and intent to invidiously discriminate
against the disproportionately affected group."30 To determine dis-
criminatory intent, a court may look to statistical application, his-
torical development, sequential events, and legislative history.31
Courts have not been inclined to strictly scrutinize continuing
residency legislation based solely on the argument that it creates a
suspect class. The Michigan Supreme Court in Detroit Police Of-
ficers' Association v. City of Detroit2 held that there was nothing
invidious or suspect in such a classification. The United States Su-
preme Court declined to review that decision for want of a sub-
stantial federal question.3 Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court referred favorably to the ruling of Detroit Police Officers
Association in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service
Commission."
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,3 5 the Su-
preme Court stated that "a suspect class is one saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." 36 The Michigan Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court in the above cases have
held that, at least in the situations encountered there, governmen-
tal employees do not yet meet this description. In circumstances
where governmental employees all share some indicia of a suspect
class, for example, race, nationality, alienage or gender, and the
purpose of the residency requirement is to restrict the rights of the
class, then a suspect class will exist such that strict scrutiny will
be applied.
B. Right to Travel
Since courts have been unwilling to overturn continuing resi-
dency requirements solely on an argument that a suspect class has
been created, litigants have turned to the contention that this type
of legislation infringes on a fundamental right. In recent years,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 155-56.
32. 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1972).
33. 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
34. 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
35. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
36. Id. at 315.
37. For example, a suspect class may exist when officials of one political subdivision,
in cooperation with residents of neighboring subdivisions, impose a continuing residency
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parties have tried to use the fundamental right to travel to invoke
the strict scrutiny test in analyzing continuing residency require-
ments. Unfortunately, most courts hold that this right is not af-
fected at all by such requirements."a
The right to travel was recognized as basic and fundamental in
United States v. Guest.39 This was reaffirmed in Shapiro v.
Thompson,40 where the Supreme Court stated that the right to
travel "is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized. '41 The right to travel has been held to include the
right to migrate from place to place, the right to find a new job,
and the right to start a new life.42 Shapiro involved a durational
residency requirement that had to be met before individuals were
eligible to receive welfare benefits. The Court invoked strict scru-
tiny because certain individuals, those who chose to move, were in
effect penalized by the requirement while others, those who chose
to stay in one county, were not. This classification of individuals
impaired the right to travel and invoked strict scrutiny. The
Court, therefore, required a compelling state interest to justify the
classification. 3
The Supreme Court, in a brief and summary opinion, dismissed
a fireman's challenge to a city's continuing residency requirement
in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission.4" A fire-
man claimed an impairment of his fundamental right to travel. In
reference to the continuing residency requirement, the Court
stated: "We have therefore held that this kind of ordinance is not
irrational.' 45 This statement indicates that the Court used the ra-
tional relationship test in analyzing the ordinance. The Court in
the rest of the opinion distinguished between its prior decisions
striking down durational residency requirements and the situation
in McCarthy. The Court then noted that in its earlier decisions,
which addressed durational residency requirements, it did not
question "'"the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly
applied bona fide residence requirements."' ,41 In dismissing the
fireman's claim, however, the Court did not explain whether the
right to travel was indeed infringed in a situation involving a con-
tinuing residency requirement.
38. See, e.g., Andre v. Bd. of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 52 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. 383 U.S. 745 (1968).
40. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41. Id. at 630.
42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. at 638.
44. 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 646.
46. Id. at 647 (quoting Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255
(1974) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972))).
[Vol. 23
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The question of whether the right to travel extends to intrastate
travel as well as interstate travel is significant since state borders
may not be involved in a significant number of cases where public
employees contest residency requirements. The Supreme Court
recognized this question and then pointedly declined to resolve it
in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.," There, the Court
held that an Arizona statute imposing a one year durational resi-
dency requirement in the county prior to becoming eligible for
emergency hospital or medical care at the county's expense cre-
ated a suspect classification and impinged on the right of inter-
state travel. The statute deprived newly arrived residents of basic
necessities of life but had no effect on established residents. Since
there was no compelling state interest justifying such a classifica-
tion, the statute was held to be violative of the equal protection
clause.
Several other courts have held that there is no right of intra-
state travel.48 With regard to continuous residency requirements,
this question usually is held to be moot since most courts hold that
only durational, and not continuing, residency requirements have
an unconstitutional impact on the right to travel, regardless of the
right being only interstate or including intrastate travel.4 9
It seems absurd that the fundamental right to travel only exists
when one crosses state lines. The only basis for this result would
be the assumption that this right is solely based upon the com-
merce clause of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution and the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Past opinions of the Supreme Court, however, establish that the
right to travel rests on no one source. Jones v. Helms50 and Sha-
piro v. Thompson5" point out that this right is not dependent on
any one clause and indeed is an aspect of the liberty interest of
the due process clause of both the fifth and the fourteenth amend-
ments, the privileges and immunities clauses of both Article 4,
section 2 and the fourteenth amendment, and the commerce
clause. Jones v. Helms was a habeas corpus action where the
Court gave constitutional approval to a Georgia statute that made
it a misdemeanor for parents to willfully abandon their children
and a felony for parents to then leave the state. The Court held
that the fundamental right to travel was not violated by the differ-
47. 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).
48. Andre, 561 F.2d at 53; Wardell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir.
1976). See also Hager, supra note 7, at 203.
49. Andre, 561 F.2d at 52; Hager, supra note 7, at 215.
50. 452 U.S. 412, (1981) (White, J., concurring).
51. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1986]
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ent levels of punishment.5 2
Helms is important in another respect: Although it did not in-
volve a continuing or durational residency requirement, the Su-
preme Court again emphasized that the right to travel is funda-
mental, but found that the statute "did not penalize the exercise
of the constitutional right to travel and did not deny ... the equal
protection of the laws . . . " because of the state's interest in
preventing parents from fleeing after abandoning their children.
Hence, the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice White stated that he understood the Court to
have used essentially a rational relationship test, regardless of
what was stated in the majority opinion, and regardless of the fun-
damental nature of the right to travel.5'
In Joseph v. City of Birmingham,55 a federal district court ex-
plained this paradox by finding that an intermediate standard is
used by the Supreme Court now in these kinds of cases. In Jo-
seph, the court determined that where a fundamental right is in-
volved, the state need not show a compelling interest, but must
show only that the questioned statute, ordinance, or regulation is
"'reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate [gov-
ernmental] interests.' "586 The plaintiff in Joseph was a candidate
running for Birmingham, Michigan, city commissioner. He chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a city charter provision disqualify-
ing any person from becoming a candidate for the office unless
that person had been a city resident for at least one year prior to
the general election. The district court in Joseph used an interme-
diate level of review and held that the residency requirement had
a "real and substantial relationship" 57 to legitimate governmental
objectives and thus did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Justice White, in the more recent case of City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,58 again noted that three levels of
review exist.59 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens perhaps
better explains the Court's true method of dealing with standards
of review:
[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to dif-
fering classifications which have been explained in opinions
52. Helms, 452 U.S. at 423.
53. Id. at 426.
54. Id. at 426-27.
55. 510 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
56. Id. at 1334-35 (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974)). See gener-
ally Symposium on Equal Protection, the Standards of Review: The Path Taken and the
Road Beyond, 57 U. DET. . URB. L. 701, 1089 (1980).
57. Joseph, 510 F. Supp. at 1337.
58. - U.S. ..-. , 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. at -, 105 St. Ct. at 3254-55.
[Vol. 23
9
Myers: The Constitutionality of Continuing Residency Requirements for Lo
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
ranging from "strict scrutiny" at one extreme to "rational basis"
at the other. I have never been persuaded that these so called
"standards" adequately explain the decisional process. Cases in-
volving classifications based on alienage, illegal residency, illegit-
imacy, gender, age, or-as in this case-mental retardation, do
not fit well into sharply defined classifications. 0
Justice Stevens continued that the Court actually is using a "ra-
tional basis" analysis in dealing with every case coming before it
and then is trying to explain the results in the framework of the
three tiered analysis of equal protection claims.61 Thus, even if it
is conceded that the right to travel is infringed by continuous resi-
dency requirements, the violation of this fundamental right still
may fail to result in heightened scrutiny under recent equal pro-
tection analysis. The infringement of the right to travel in resi-
dency cases, however, is by no means conceded. As the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in the leading case of Andre v.
Board of Trustees,6 2 most courts decline to find that continuous
residency requirements, as distinguished from durational resi-
dency requirements, infringe on the right to travel at all. Thus,
heightened scrutiny need not be applied to the state action.6 3
Moreover, a significant number of courts have held that no right
to intrastate travel exists." Andre involved a challenge by
Maywood, Illinois, public employees of the constitutionality of an
ordinance imposing a continuous residency requirement on the
employees. The court rejected a number of arguments by the em-
ployees and concluded that there was no vested contractual right
to live outside Maywood village limits,6 5 that the village's actions
did not create an estoppel" and that there was no violation of the
right to travel because of the ordinance.67
Regardless of decisions such as Andre, continuous residency re-
quirements clearly do have a constitutionally significant impact on
the right to travel. In Shapiro v. Thompson, which invalidated a
durational residency requirement, the Court held that an indi-
gent's right to travel was unconstitutionally infringed because he
would hesitate to move if he knew that he would risk losing wel-
60. Id. at -' 105, S. Ct. at 3260-61.
61. Id. at . 105 S. Ct. at 3261.
62. 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977).
63. Id. at 53.
64. Id. at 53 (citing Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1975); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974); and Ector v.
City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 935 (1974)).
65. Andre, 561 F.2d at 51-52.
66. Id. at 50-51.
67. Id. at 52-53.
19861
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fare benefits by doing so. 6 8 This logic is equally applicable when
an employee of a local government decides not to move out of the
city or school district that employs him because he would risk los-
ing his job in doing so by violating a continuous residency require-
ment. Most courts, taking their cue from McCarthy, ignore this
logic though and find that the right to travel has not been violated
by continuing residency requirements.69
At least two cases have found that continuing residency require-
ments do infringe on the right to travel.70 These two cases further
found no corresponding compelling state interest to justify the im-
position of a continuing residency requirement upon governmental
employees who are neither policemen nor firemen. Donnelly v.
City of Manchester1 and another case, Angwin v. City of
Manchester,2 also stand for the proposition that states may grant
more rights under their state constitutions than are available
under the federal constitution. In Hanson v. Unified School Dis-
trict Number 500, Wyandotte County, Kansas,3 the court found
that the reasons advanced by a school district to justify its contin-
uing residency requirement did not even meet the rational rela-
tionship test. The court there did not reach the question of
whether a fundamental right was violated. However, these deci-
sions which hold that continuing residency requirements do in-
fringe on a fundamental right are in the extreme minority of
cases.
7 4
C. Other Fundamental Rights
When a continuous residency requirement is adopted and im-
posed on governmental employees who, under state law, already
have a vested property interest in their jobs, then a more success-
ful challenge may be made. Retroactive legislation changing this
legal relationship could be a deprivation of property without due
process of law.75 The United States Constitution states that "[n]o
68. 394 U.S. 618, 628-31 (1969).
69. See, e.g., Andre, 561 F.2d at 52.
70. Fraternal Order of Police v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 201, 360 N.E.2d 708,
718 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976), and Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111
N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
71. 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
72. 118 N.H. 336, 386 A.2d 1272 (1978).
73. 364 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1973).
74. For contrary holdings, see, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n,
424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam); Wardell v. Bd. of Educ., 522 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976);
Wright v. City of Jackson, Miss., 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975); and Cook County Teach-
ers' Union Local 1600 v. Taylor, 432 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. I11. 1977).
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state shall ... pass any.., law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts." In Fraternal Order of Police v. Hunter,7 the court, not-
ing that this prohibition also applies to administrative regulations,
held that the state had a compelling interest in imposing a contin-
uous residency requirement on policemen and firemen, but that
imposing such a requirement on other civil service employees vio-
lated due process.78
In Ector v. City of Torrance,79 a city librarian's attempt to
avoid a continuing residency requirement by invoking the funda-
mental right of privacy, the right to marry and establish a home,
the right to raise and educate one's children and the fundamental
right to associate with neighbors of one's choice was harshly re-jected by Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court. Describ-
ing the librarian's arguments as "esoteric" and "Thoreauvian,"
Justice Mosk stated that the appellant was able to cite no author-
ity supporting her claims. 80 Finding no violation of fundamental
rights, Justice Mosk used the rational relationship test in analyz-
ing the city's continuing residency requirements. A series of gov-
ernmental purposes was listed by the court to justify the residency
requirement.8" The rights that the librarian claimed were violated
were not proven to be actually and significantly impaired. Justice
Mosk held that whether a legislative act is to be denied a pre-
sumption of validity and be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny
"does not turn on the ingenuity of counsel in conceiving remotely
possible ways in which the act might affect those rights. '82
These arguments, unfortunately, seem to have lain dormant
since Ector. The above noted rights, strongly associated with the
liberty interest protected by the due process clauses, arguably are
both fundamental and significantly impaired by continuing resi-
dency requirements. In Prince v. Massachusetts,"3 the United
States Supreme Court emphasized that one of the freedoms of a
parent is the freedom to educate his child as he chooses. Justice
Douglas stated that the right to educate one's child in the school
of one's choice, whether public or private, is protected by the first
and fourteenth amendment. 85 The Supreme Court noted in San
76. U.S. CONsT. art. I, sec. 10.
77. 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708 (1975).
78. Fraternal Order of Police, 49 Ohio App. 2d at 200, 360 N.E.2d at 717.
79. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974).
80. Id. at 136-37, 514 P.2d at 437, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54.
81. Id. at 135, 514 P.2d at 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
82. Id. at 136, 514 P.2d at 437, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
83. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
84. See also Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,86 however,
that the actual right to be educated is not fundamental.8"
The imposition of a continuing residency requirement on a
spouse creates a number of dilemmas. The spouse is forced to
choose between the breakup of the marital home due to living sep-
arately from his or her family, taking up the family roots and
moving into the political subdivision which imposed the require-
ment, or losing perhaps the only employment available in today's
economy. This situation should require a compelling interest on
the behalf of the local government. Justice Harlan in 1961 stated
that "[t]he home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family
life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental
that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of
more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.""8
In Meyer v. Nebraska,89 the Supreme Court held that the due
process liberty interest "[w]ithout doubt . . . denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to . . . establish a home and bring up children. . . -"o Justice
Goldberg stated in Griswold v. Connecticut that "[t]he entire
fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie
its specific guarantees demonstrate that the right to marital pri-
vacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."'"
Given the above, the librarian's claim in Ector can hardly be
termed "esoteric," Thoreauvian," or without any authority.
Rather, substantial Supreme Court authority supports the pro-
position that continuing residency requirements infringe on the
right to privacy, the right to marry and establish a home, the right
to raise and educate one's children and the right to associate with
neighbors of one's choice, all of which arguably are fundamental
rights.
It is poignant to note that one of the reasons for the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment was that in some Southern states after
the Civil War, former slaves were forced by law to reside on the
land they cultivated. Continuing residency requirements are re-
markably similar to the badges and incidents of slavery prohibited
by the thirteenth amendment.92
86. 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
87. Id. at 35.
88. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
89. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
90. Id. at 377. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-220 (1944).
91. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See also Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Jones V. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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Significantly, the Supreme Court has not passed upon a contin-
uing residency requirement case that did not involve policemen or
firemen. Justice Brennan has stated:
There will always be the puzzling problem of how to deal with
cases that are similar, but not identical, to some case that has
been summarily disposed of in this Court. Courts should, of
course, not feel bound to treat a summary disposition as binding
beyond those situations in which the issues are the same.93
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission94 is the
Supreme Court case lower courts consistently cite in upholding
continuing residency requirements. While McCarthy was not a
summary disposition, it was unnecessarily brief and nonex-
planatory and only dealt with a fireman's claim. Public employees
who are neither policemen nor firemen, therefore, should question
its effect upon their rights.9 5
III. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Other arguments have been sought because nonresidents have
not in themselves been held to be a suspect class and since a fun-
damental right, specifically the right to travel, has not consistently
been held to be violated by continuing residency requirements.
The most persuasive contention perhaps can be based on the privi-
leges and immunities clause of Article 4, section 2 of the United
States Constitution. This clause provides that the "Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges, and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."96
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc.,7 the Supreme Court stated that if local government workers
are paid with federal funds, then residency requirements may not
be imposed unless permitted by Congress. White held, however,
that the commerce clause does not prevent a city from imposing
residency requirements on employees of construction companies
working on city funded projects. The Court reasoned that since it
expended only its own funds on these projects, the city was only a
"market participant" and thus, did not regulate interstate
93. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 920 (1976) (mem.,
Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
95. See, e.g., Hanson v. United School Dist. No. 500, Wyandotte County, Kan., 364
F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1973).
96. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment bars a state from violating national rights obtained by citizenship rather than
state rights secured by residency. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
97. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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commerce. o8
White, however, failed to discuss the impact of the privileges
and immunities clause. In contrast, in United Building and Con-
struction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Coun-
cil of Camden,99 the Supreme Court did address the privileges
and immunities clause and held that it is as applicable to munici-
pal ordinances as it is to state statutes.100 The Court justified this
position by stating that (1) a municipality is a mere subdivision of
the state,10 1 and (2) "[a] person who is not residing in a given
State is ipso facto not residing in a city within that State."102 The
Court then held that the city, by use of the challenged ordinance,
could not impose a city residency requirement upon employees of
construction companies working on city funded projects unless the
city's ordinance met the requirements imposed by the privileges
and immunities clause. 103 The privileges and immunities clause
precludes discrimination against nonresidents unless (1) there is a
substantial reason for the difference in treatment and (2) the dis-
crimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial re-
lationship to the state's objective. 0 The Court held that the privi-
leges and immunites analysis is not invoked unless the challenged
ordinance affects one of the privileges or immunities bearing upon
the nation as a single entity.105 The Court held that the pursuit of
a common calling, the right to be employed, is covered under this
clause.106 However, the Court then noted that public employment
is "qualitatively different," and is certainly not a fundamental
right for purposes of the equal protection clause.10
7
The question of whether public employment is a fundamental
right entitled to the protection of the privileges and immunities
clause was simply left open by the Court.108 The Court held that
the employees of construction companies working on projects par-
tially or fully funded by the city of Camden were entitled to the
protection afforded by the clause.109 In order to satisfy the clause,
Camden had to show a "substantial reason" for the difference in
98. Id. at 214-15.
99. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
100. Id. at 214.
101. Id. at 215.
102. Id. at 216-17.
103. Id. at 221.
104. Id. at 222.
105. Id. at 218 (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,
383 (1978)).
106. United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 219.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 221-22.
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treatment and show that the nonresident construction workers
constituted a "peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is
aimed."110
For public employees to be entitled to the clause's protection,
the Court seems to hold that the fact that the employment is pub-
lic in nature is immaterial; instead, what is critical is that the
Court is shown that the opportunity to seek employment "is 'suffi-
ciently basic to the livelihood of the Nation' . . . as to fall within
the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause .... -11' This
may be surprisingly easy to prove when there are 14,128,000 local
government employees in the United States, and a large, perhaps
overwhelming, percentage of these employees are burdened by
residency requirements. 112
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,"3 the United
States Supreme Court held that the privileges and immunities
clause was violated by a New Hampshire Supreme Court rule
limiting bar admission to attorneys residing within the state.11 4
Piper, a Vermont resident, was denied admission to the New
Hampshire state bar because of the rule and challenged it success-
fully. The United States Supreme Court followed the analysis
used in United Building and Construction Trades Council and
found the rule invalid. In Piper, the Court found that the practice
of law was a "fundamental right" that was "important to the na-
tional economy.' 1 15 The New Hampshire Supreme Court did not
advance any substantial reasons for barring nonresident attorneys.
It was held "that the means chosen [did] not bear the necessary
relationship to the State's objectives."116 The state argued that a
lawyer is an " 'officer of the court,' who 'exercises state power on
a daily basis.' 1117 However, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that "a lawyer is not an 'officer' of the State in any political
sense""$ and that the practice of law does not involve an "'exer-
cise of state power' justifying New Hampshire's residency require-
ment." 1 9 The holding in Piper may not directly bear on public
employee residency requirements since lawyers are not public em-
ployees. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion strengthens the argu-
ment that governmental employees who do not exercise "state
110. Id. at 222 (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 398).
11i. United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 221 (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388).
112. See supra note 1.
113. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
114. Id. at 288.
115. Id. at 281.
116. Id. at 285.
117. Id. at 282.
118. Id. at 283.
119. Id. at 282.
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power" or make decisions involving "matters of state policy" are
protected by the privileges and immunities clause from continuing
residency requirements. 120 The Court's analysis in United Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council of the privileges and immu-
nities clause does .not necessarily rule out such a conclusion be-
cause of the emphasis that the Court placed on the opportunity
for, rather than the nature of, the work.1 21
IV. SUMMARY
It seems clear that fundamental rights are violated by continu-
ing residency requirements. Local governments, for political or
other reasons, will continue to impose these requirements on their
employees. Courts should ensure that local governments at least
fully justify these requirements with legitimate, fair and substan-
tial reasons as required by the Supreme Court. Local governments
should be required to demonstrate both that their residency re-
quirements are not overly broad in the categories of the public
servants they burden and that alternative solutions such as resi-
dency within a certain radius of the local governmental unit will
not suffice.
The rational relationship test that courts apply requires more
than just a perfunctory justification. The reasons advanced by
government must be at least "'reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation . . "12 This is more
than a spurious, nebulous requirement. Joseph v. City of Birming-
ham1 23 and City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center124
indicate a growing trend to apply a heightened standard of review
to statutes creating classifications, either using an intermediate
standard of review or a rational basis analysis rigorously and con-
sistently applied. When this is done, the clear violation of the
right of interstate and intrastate travel should not be ignored. The
privileges and immunities clause of Article 4, section 2 should be
asserted by local government employees who do not exercise state
power or make decisions involving matters of state policy. Such
assertions again will require local governments to justify their con-
tinuing residency requirements with substantial reasons.
120. Id. at 282-83.
121. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
122. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
123. 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
124. - U.S., , 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Over a decade ago, Elrod v. Burns125 emphasized that the
"'theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasona-
ble, has been uniformly rejected.' 1126 To so impair the fundamen-
tal rights of public servants by telling them where to buy their
homes, where to raise their families and where to send their chil-
dren to school surely seems too "Orwellian" a method to accom-
plish the legitimate goals that are sought by government.
125. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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